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1. Introduction
Digital technology with its near zero copying and (since the in-
ternet) transmission costs has disrupted value chains based upon the
trading of music and other cultural products stored on physical media
such as records or compact disks (CDs). A 2014 Special Issue of
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, examined these processes
of “disassembly” and “reassembly” of business and service models
(Mangematin et al., 2014: 2). It highlighted the efforts of entrenched
industry players in the West to reassert their control over the sector
(Blanc and Huault, 2014; Dobusch and Schüßler, 2014), an observation
confirmed by later work (Rogers and Preston, 2016; Sun, 2016).
The study we present here, conducted between 2015 and 2017,
charts the strikingly different picture of China's digital music environ-
ment. The rapid proliferation of a wide-range of online services in
music, film, literature and beyond is driving radical reconfiguration of
business and service models and paving the way for a resurgence in its
cultural industries.
Focusing in this paper on digital music services, we will show how
China's so-called ‘internet giants’,1 Baidu, Alibaba and TenCent (jointly
described as BAT) have become heavily engaged with the whole process
of digital cultural content creation and distribution. Exploiting, through
takeover and emulation, the flowering of start-up digital music plat-
forms and services, BAT has launched a huge range of free and low-
priced services.
Our project had an overarching objective to understand how the
rapid and far-reaching changes in China's digital cultural ecosystem had
been shaped by China's very different institutional and legal setting.
Our specific research questions addressed the distinctive dynamics of
innovation in terms, respectively, of process and outcomes: how these
contextual features had driven a process of sustained experimentation
(discovery-driven innovation) at scale; and, how this has resulted in the
emergence of distinctive novel service models and value propositions.
Writers from organisation studies and science and technology stu-
dies (STS) have examined the potentially disruptive outcomes of digi-
tisation in creative cultural industries. However their differing analy-
tical tools and presumptions have generated somewhat contrasting
accounts. STS would anticipate that digitisation in differing contexts
may generate different pathways and outcomes. Institutionalist per-
spectives instead highlight isomorphism that might arise for example
from global harmonisation of regulatory environments and shared
technologies and service models. We were excited to discover con-
ceptual and methodological convergence between STS and a group of
institutionalist analysts of technological fields undergoing profound
transformation (Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Lewin and Volberda, 1999; El
Sawy et al., 2010; Meyer et al., 2005).
Drawing upon these complementary traditions we developed a
multi-sited study of the evolving digital music ecology in China, centred
on BAT and regulatory/policy players. Our contextual and processual
analysis charts the complex sets of interactions and changing relation-
ships over time between BAT and other key commercial players, reg-
ulators, creators and customers. We highlight twin distinctive features
characterising the exceptional dynamism of the development of digital
music and other cultural industries in the Chinese context: i) rapid and
sustained reconfiguration (disassembly and reassembly) of Western
templates has thrown up novel service models; and ii) China has be-
come a laboratory for business experiment as firms responded to this
rapidly evolving and uncertain context by launching at scale a rapid
succession of service innovations. These have underpinned the ela-
boration by the internet giants of distinctive service models and cross-
platform service infrastructures,2 which allow diverse value proposi-
tions to be pursued.
This paper is organised into five sections. We outline our analytic
framework, and discuss our methodology/research strategy. After
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characterising the Chinese context, we chart in detail the evolution of
online music development. We then analyse how the development of
China's digital music industry was shaped by its historical institutional
and regulatory context. Our conclusion highlights the dynamic evolu-
tion of China's digital cultural ecology, through sustained discovery-
driven innovation at scale and reflects upon conceptual and methodo-
logical issues involved in addressing the evolution of sectors in flux.
2. Analytical framework and research strategy
We approached these developments from a background in STS. The
social shaping of technology perspective (MacKenzie and Wajcman,
1999) would anticipate that these developments might unfold in a very
different manner in the contrasting context of China's digital cultural
industries, shaped by differences in the legal and institutional landscape
and in the strategies of the players involved and interactions between
them.
Cognate research from Organisation Studies has explored the im-
plications of digital technology for creative industries in the West.
Institutionalist studies of established players in the music sector (Blanc
and Huault, 2014; Dobusch and Schüßler, 2014), in France and Ger-
many respectively, have drawn attention to the efforts of entrenched
players to maintain the status quo in the face of potentially disruptive
digitisation.
Traditional institutionalist perspectives (Di Maggio and Powell,
1991; Zysman, 1994), with their concern to explain the emergence of
shared logics and practices within and between organisations (Zietsma
and Lawrence, 2010; Zietsma and Mcknight, 2009), seem better
equipped to address stability than dynamism (Mangematin et al., 2014;
Meyer et al., 2005). In this connection, Meyer et al. (2005: 459) criti-
cally observe that “mainstream theories of industries and organiza-
tional fields presume that equilibrium is sought and achieved by firms,
markets, and sectors”. They argue that “these ideas and tools do not
apply” (ibid. 456) in organisational contexts far from equilibrium, such
as emerging industries or industries in rapid flux. These warnings would
seem highly pertinent to current disruptive digitisation (Wang et al.,
2015), and in particular the developments we examine in China which
seem to exhibit what El Sawy et al. (2010) have described as hy-
perturbulence. Meyer et al. (2005) and other institutionalist analysts
have begun to outline the “new intellectual perspectives and metho-
dological heuristics” (idem: 456) that may be needed in these contexts.
Whilst neoinstitutionalism emerged around a concern to explain
isomorphism, stability and equilibrium (Di Maggio and Powell, 1991;
Mangematin et al., 2014; Meyer et al., 2005), STS perspectives have
from the outset emphasised the need for accounts that attend to both
dynamism and stability, and to both (emergent) “hot” and (in-
stitutionalised) “cold” contexts of innovation. In seeking to address in
tandem the scope for action as well as the constraints of particular
historical settings (Bijker, 1995; Callon, 1998; Law and Bijker, 1992)
various writers have sought evolutionary explanations of change,
drawing notably on work on technology regimes and paradigms from
the related field of innovation studies (Dosi, 1982; Nelson and Winter,
1982), to explore how change takes place through interactive learning
across a diverse ecology of actors (Andersen and Lundvall, 1988). STS
analyses how technological innovations were shaped by their societal
contexts (MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1999). Later work addresses the
distributed ‘social learning’ processes through which suppliers, inter-
mediaries and consumers seek to understand and exploit new techno-
logical opportunities (Sørensen, 1996).
Parallel intellectual moves have arisen within organisation studies
amongst a group of analysts arguing for greater attention to be paid to
rapidly changing and emerging industries (Aldrich and Fiol 1994;
Lewin and Volberda, 1999; Meyer et al., 2005). They proposed very
different conceptual and methodological approaches. In particular,
Meyer et al. (2005) map out in detail a ‘research posture’ that is
“coevolutionary, multilevel, contextual, processual, and emergent”
(idem 456) to address ‘fields in flux’ and undergoing profound trans-
formation. Their recommendations, based on an “an unabashedly social
constructionist account”3 (Meyer et al. 2005: 467) demonstrate striking
conceptual and methodological parallels with contemporary STS re-
search frameworks. Thus calls by Meyer et al. (2005: 470) for multi-
level and multi-temporal (historical and longitudinal) research with
“nuanced temporal theorizing about cycles, pacing, and event se-
quences.” mirror frameworks advanced for investigating the Biography
of Artefacts and Practices (Hyysalo et al., 2018; Pollock and Williams,
2009).
Other institutionalist contributions have also proposed evolutionary
accounts (Lewin and Volberda, 1999; Mangematin et al., 2014), ad-
dressed through ecological approaches (Meyer et al., 2005; Aldrich and
Fiol 1994; Lewin and Volberda, 1999; El Sawy et al., 2010; Wang et al.,
2015) and longitudinal studies (e.g. Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Lewin and
Volberda, 1999).
These debates also bear upon ecological and ecosystem perspec-
tives. The critique advanced by Meyer et al. (2005) of equilibrium
presumptions can equally be applied to life-cycle models (e.g. Waldner
et al.'s, 2015 account of how opportunities for innovation vary at dif-
ferent stages in a product life-cycle). Such cyclical models, with their
tacit presumption of homology between successive cycles, are perhaps
better suited to addressing changing product cycles within a broad
technology paradigm; their relevance may be questioned in the case of
sectors that are emerging or in flux (like this case) where radical dis-
ruption may transform boundaries, structures and paradigms (Meyer
et al., 2005).
A similar critique can be applied to ecosystem models (Shaw and
Allen, 2016; Tsujimoto et al., in press), whose current popularity is
driven in part by the salience of technology platforms (Wareham et al.,
2014). Applying templates from biology food chains (Moore, 1993)
these accounts focus on the establishment of stable structures and lo-
cations within a sector, highlighting the role of focal organisations or
other governance structures (Wareham et al., 2014) in generating the
alignments needed within a multilateral trading community “for a focal
value proposition to materialize” (Adner, 2017: 40). These analyses of
ecosystems in terms of characteristic positions and structures within the
community of players, conceived as coherent systems (Tsujimoto et al.,
in press) or meta-organisations (Gawer, 2014) also rest upon equili-
brium presumptions which are not appropriate for the developments we
address. We note the observation by Tang and Lyons (2017) that ex-
isting business ecosystem models do not match well the development of
digital music in China. Other, more appropriate conceptualisations are
available, which we explore below. They are often couched in terms of
ecologies (Abbott, 1995), to avoid the presumption of set boundaries
and positions that besets much ecosystems writing.
Recent contributions helpfully focus upon the dynamics of eco-
system evolution (El Sawy et al., 2010) and the consequent tensions
between stability and flexibility (Wareham et al., 2014). Wang et al.
(2015) highlight the influence of community structure and context on
the evolution of ecologies in the case of digital innovation strategy.
They suggest that different starting points and alignments within
ecologies may yield different outcomes (El Sawy et al., 2010). The
scope for manoeuvre and constraint may vary across contexts (Lewin
and Volberda, 1999: 523). Intriguingly, Lewin and Volberda (1999) and
related organisation studies accounts, in describing how technological
and institutional structures constrain in a manner that is not rigid but
leaves scope for and may enable choice, have resorted to a terminology
of configuration (see for example, Lewin and Volberda, 1999; El Sawy
3 See also Aldrich and Fiol (1994:649) who develop an ‘institutional con-
structionist’ argument that “Social contexts present entrepreneurs with many
constraints, yet they also set the conditions that create windows of opportunity.
Through processes of social construction, entrepreneurs can develop new
meanings that may eventually alter institutional norms”.
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et al., 2010; Gawer, 2014; Shaw and Allen, 2016; Adner, 2017). In so
doing they serendipitously align with a parallel conceptual develop-
ment in STS accounts that addresses contextual influences in techno-
logical change (Fleck, 1993; Hyysalo et al., 2018).
This departure from presumptions of isomorphism opens up ques-
tions about management strategy (Lewin and Volberda, 1999). Thus
McGrath (2010) notes that traditional analytical approaches to man-
agement decision-making that might prevail in stable contexts give way
in a fast moving and unpredictable environments to ‘a discovery driven
approach’. In an uncertain context, “it is more sensible to engage in ex-
perimentation and discovery than to try to assume the relevant information
is all known”(McGrath 2010: 252). Similarly Sosna et al. (2010) observe
that, in dynamic and uncertain contexts, innovation may proceed
through “trial-and-error learning” [Idem.: 402]. Thompson and
MacMillan (2010) argue that such discovery-driven principles are
particularly applicable when developing business models in emerging
markets “characterised by significantly high - or near-Knightian – un-
certainty” [Idem.: 291]. As developments are highly path–dependent –
early experiments shape the trajectory for models yet to come - it is
nearly impossible to anticipate which will succeed (McGrath, 2010).
Incompleteness of information, particularly about user responses to
new offerings, favours experimentation including collective learning
experiments (de Vasconcelos Gomes et al., 2018) and other strategies to
manage collective uncertainties confronting players. Thompson and
MacMillan (2010: 296) suggest that these settings favour particular
kinds of experimental or discovery-driven approaches, characterised by
the nostrum “launch inexpensively and redirect as the business evolves
… or stop them while resource commitments are still minimal. These
observations closely mirror STS analyses of social learning in techno-
logical innovation” - defined by Sørensen (1996: 6) as “a combined act
of discovery and analysis” – supported through practices of experi-
mentation and ‘learning by doing’ (Sørensen, 1996; Williams et al.,
2005).
Firms may need to balance and manage tensions between experi-
mentation and exploitation (Achtenhagen et al., 2013; Massa et al.,
2017; Smith et al., 2010). Experimental approaches may give way to
more carefully calculated choices geared towards securing competitive
advantage as markets become stabilised (Massa et al., 2017). These
observations are particularly pertinent to rapidly changing digital
creative industries. Hadida and Paris (2014) criticise the continued
resort to traditional value chain models despite evidence that they are
not applicable or effective for industries in a state of flux like digital
music. They highlight “the diversity and plurality of value propositions,
the co-construction of value, and the expanded role of intermediaries in
the creative industries” (Idem.: 94) despite the absence of a proven
economic model.
Mangematin et al. (2014), in their introduction to the 2014 Special
Issue of Technological Forecasting and Social Change on “digital tech-
nology and creative industries”, have characterised these transforma-
tions as involving processes of disassembly: “the shaking of existing
business models of transaction and distribution”, and reassembly, using
“new tools and architectures to interact with audiences and communities in
selected creative industries” (Mangematin et al., 2014: 2). Mangematin
et al. (2014) note that the papers in their collection are mainly rooted in
European national settings. China offers a very different context in
which to explore the radical reconfiguration of value chains in creation
and distribution and consumption of cultural products. We explore the
relevance of these perspectives to this multi-centric study of the
opening moves in the evolution of China's digital music ecology.
3. Methodology
3.1. Research strategies for addressing dynamic ecologies
These discussions highlight important points of conceptual overlap
between STS and organisation studies in their treatment of emerging
ecologies. A much clearer convergence is evident in relation to the
methodologies proposed for addressing these settings where various
organisation studies scholars have turned towards the less-structured
qualitative methods of enquiry traditionally favoured by constructionist
STS researchers.
Meyer et al. (2005: 458) argue that organisational science re-
searchers studying “volatile ecosystems, emerging sectors, shifting
boundaries, and proliferating network forms” need to adopt more
complex research strategies, triangulating between diverse historical,
ethnographic and structured survey methodologies. Meyer et al. (2005:
458) note how, in seeking to engage with rapidly changing settings,
their “research design shifted from cross-sectional to longitudinal data
collection” while “the theoretical platform shifted from testing a var-
iance theory to building a process theory. … In each case, the unit of
analysis shifted from focal organizations in exogenous environments, to
be replaced by a set of nested units— organizations, that collectively
constitute a population, amalgamated into an ecological community,
embedded in a changing organizational field.” (see also El Sawy et al.,
2010).
Dynamic developments, shaped by local interactions, may not be
effectively captured by the traditional institutionalist research meth-
odologies based on sector level surveys or studies of focal organisations.
If the role and orientation of the various actors is diverse and changing,
they need to be addressed through less structured qualitative research
instruments (Shaw and Allen, 2016) such as ethnographic interviews
(Meyer et al., 2005) rather than quantitative surveys with their pre-
sumptions about the stability and comparability of classes of actors.
Large-scale survey methods in particular run the risk of losing detailed
insight into the specificity of organisations and the dynamics of their
interactions within a community.
Alongside this move towards ethnographic, historical and other
qualitative research methods are calls for multi-actor and multi-level
enquiry (Meyer et al., 2005; Shaw and Allen, 2016). Lewin and
Volberda (1999) argue the need to move away from a single lens per-
spective (whether of firm level studies or of sector level studies) and
instead to study the co-evolution of firm and industry and the emer-
gence of new organisational forms within an ecology. A growing body
of studies address these developments at multiple levels of analysis
encompassing specific firms and the population of entities they interact
with including consumers/consumption as well as production and dis-
tribution (Baden-Fuller and Mangematin, 2015; Huygens et al., 2001;
Mangematin et al., 2014; Massa et al., 2017; Zott et al., 2011).
3.2. Research design
The findings presented here arose from an investigation:
Convergence or differentiation in IP protection? A case study of new models
for digital film, music and e-fiction production and distribution in China,
funded by the AHRC China Digital Copyright Centre, the Newton Fund
and the RCUK Research Centre for Copyright and New Business Models
in the Creative Economy (CREATe). Our attention had been drawn to
novel developments in China's digital cultural industries which differed
from those in the West, in which the BAT internet giants appeared to be
playing an important role.
Our research emerged with a broad concern to understand how
digitisation had been shaped by China's very different institutional and
legal setting. As the project developed this evolved into a more specific
set of research questions that sought to account for the rapid and far-
reaching changes in China's digital cultural ecosystem; how these had
driven a process of sustained experimentation (discovery-driven in-
novation) at scale; and, how this has resulted in the emergence of
distinctive novel service models and value propositions.
These considerations profoundly shaped our research design. To
capture developments across an ecology in flux, we followed Meyer
et al. (2005: 459) who propose triangulating between a range of sources
through a ‘bricolage’ of different methods including brief ethnographic
X. Shen et al. Technological Forecasting & Social Change 139 (2019) 235–249
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engagements to capture emergent responses across a range of settings.4
Careful preparation was needed to develop and guide this ex-
ploratory study (Walsham, 1995). We established an interdisciplinary
team of seven Chinese and UK scholars, supported by research students,
who began to develop an understanding of developments in digital
cultural industries in China initially through desk research. We tracked
cognate developments in Europe and North America through desk re-
search, doctoral research (Sun, 2016) and discussions with colleagues
in the CREATe programme. We refined these initial understandings
through informal discussion with established academic experts in these
fields from Chinese universities/research institutes active in the in-
dustries in question and extending research access through ‘snowbal-
ling’ techniques to Chinese industry and policy players. Establishing
research access and broadening and sustaining it over time presents
particular difficulties in the Chinese context where there has not been a
tradition of access by industry and policy communities to social science
research.
Our goal was to establish a long-term relationship with key stake-
holders in the field. A concise description of the research project was
produced to attract and sustain the interest of the targeted players and
establish consent and research governance arrangements. Data collec-
tion and processing sought to gain understanding of complex processes
unfolding in real time primarily through detailed personal interviews,
repeated over time, to capture accurately the changes taking place and
participant's understandings of these changes. Interview topic guides
were adapted for particular respondents in different sectors and roles
and were modified as new issues emerged as the research progressed.
Post-interview communications with almost all Chinese interviewees,
particularly via WeChat,5 allowed us to check data accuracy, request
clarifications and pose additional questions from respondents who were
highly engaged with (and also struggling to make sense of) these
complex developments. The period between these blocks was devoted
to reviewing the data and preparing for further rounds. Interviews with
key industrial players were repeated over at least two rounds: the first
typically involved senior management players; follow up interviews
extended to those with more hands-on involvement in the commercial
and legal dimensions of the business. This extended engagement pro-
vided opportunities not only to collect and verify data about a highly
uncertain and rapidly changing setting, but also for joint sense-making
about the character and implications of these still-unfolding develop-
ments. Our respondents were also trying to understand these develop-
ments from their particular perspectives and points of insertion. In this
respect, our respondents became co-researchers in a joint process of
sense-making, providing insights throughout the life of investigation,
continuing to reflect and comment upon emerging findings until the
end-of-project workshops.
Our primary investigation targeted three groups:
1) key players in the Chinese online creative industries, and in parti-
cular the three Internet giants (Baidu, Alibaba and TenCent);
2) professional associations, commercial, licensing and regulatory
bodies and other key intermediary organisations influencing the
development of the sectors, including professional associations in
the creative cultural sectors, commercial and regulatory agents of
both domestic and overseas; and,
3) experts and academic specialists in the fields.
Fieldwork was conducted between December 2015 and April 2017,
a duration that afforded some opportunities to observe changes over
time in the strategies and activities of the players involved. The primary
data collection comprised 59 semi-structured interviews, conducted in
three blocks, with a total of 73 respondents (a table showing anon-
ymised respondent roles has been uploaded as an appendix). This was
supported by diverse secondary sources in English and Chinese. We
reviewed policy documents and the existing literature, and also tracked
the enormous array of media reports, online blogs and commentary.6
The research team also embarked upon an array of exploratory activ-
ities including, registering and using purposively the online services
provided by the platforms under scrutiny, taking part in events orga-
nised by key players and stakeholders, and discussing various pressing
issues with them. The team also kept a watching brief with their peers
and contacts regarding the evolution of new services and practices (e.g.
regarding consumption of online music, e-literature, videos) during the
period of the project. We also organised end-of-project workshops
(Beijing 6.4.2017; Edinburgh 5.6.2017) to which we invited academic
and industry experts, policymakers and practitioners, including most of
our respondents. The workshops were designed to elicit additional in-
puts and verify and extend emerging findings. In a context in which
there are few established sources or fora they provided an opportunity
to explore and reconcile different stakeholder perceptions.
Our investigation encompassed three creative cultural industries:
music, e-literature and film. Our enquiries explore the specificities of
different types of cultural production and consumption and also flagged
significant interactions between these areas. These interactions proved
to have crucial importance in the case of Chinese internet-based op-
erations (for example where popular performers were able to exploit
their reputations across platforms – e.g. singers becoming film stars
(Lui, 2010)). In this paper we focus on digital music where we were also
able to derive insights our previous research in the UK (Sun, 2016).
Though we were not able to directly address the experience of music
consumers and music creators engaging with these services - a matter of
concern insofar as our framework and industry perceptions flag their
crucial importance - we were able to examine the understandings of
consumers/consumption amongst the practitioners we interviewed and
also draw upon online sources and the modest academic literature on
this subject and finally draw upon the experience of our Chinese re-
searchers (and that of their peers) who registered on these platforms
and used as many services as possible.
4. The Chinese context
4.1. The socialist history
In China's socialist regime, music and many other forms of cultural
production and dissemination were under the control of the govern-
ment. The administration determined who could become a musician
including the (modest) number of people to be regarded as composers,
lyric writers, singers (performers), and music instrument players.
Musician was a prestigious professional role, on the government pay-
roll, employed by public institutions at local, provincial or state levels.
This elite status was not easily attained by those outside the profes-
sional system even if they possessed artistic talent. Music related ac-
tivities, as part of the development of culture and arts of the society,
had nothing to do with commerce or profit. Rather, it was regarded as a
propaganda instrument of the state for uplifting peoples' spirit in the
4 Here we were guided by our STS-informed methodology which addresses
the “translation terrain” (Williams et al., 2005), comprising: the character of the
key players involved; the perceptions, capabilities and strategies of these key
players; how these are shaped by the historical context; the relationships be-
tween players, the dynamics of the interaction between them; changes in their
strategy and arrival of newcomers and how these shape the development tra-
jectory (co-evolution).
5WeChat is an alternative messaging service to email communication while
having various advanced features, such as on-time audio & visual conversation,
and existing messaging transfer.
6 Online media searches in Chinese were particularly fruitful using search
terms baidu baike (百度百科in Chinese), baidu wenku (百度文库in Chinese) and
zhihu.com (知乎in Chinese). The information collected in this way was often
inconsistent and partial, requiring careful triangulation between sources.
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construction of China's socialist society. To achieve this goal, music
production and distribution, like other arts and literature, were closely
scrutinised/controlled by the state. During the extremes of Cultural
Revolution (1965–1976), Eight Model Plays (八个样板戏) were pro-
moted by the government as the model of socialist art and the whole
population of China was expected to sing from this repertoire.
As a result, the music industry in China was very undeveloped
compared to the West in terms of both the quantity of music works and
music related business entities.7 The other feature inherited from the
socialist regime was the weak copyright regime. As music and other
creative works had been created with resources from the state, they
were seen as belonging to the entire population. So even though, as part
of accession to the World Trade Organisation, China rapidly put into
place intellectual property (IP) legislation and enforcement mechan-
isms modelled on those in the West (Lui, 2010; Shen, 2015) there was
little popular support for copyright protection. As a result, as China
opened up to the global economy following economic reforms, it be-
came the biggest ‘black market’ for pirated music, not only Chinese
music, but also Western products. Pirate CDs or Digital Video Discs
(DVDs) were easy to get held of. Soon after release, a music CD or DVD
album, which might sell in Britain for £15, could be purchased on the
Chinese black market for one US dollar. China faced continued criticism
by international business institutions, such as the International In-
tellectual Property Alliance (IIPA, 2012) for the persistence of rampant
piracy.
4.2. “A hundred flowers blooming”
Though widespread piracy and the weak enforcement of Intellectual
Property (IP) rights in China was seen as inhibiting innovation and the
health of creative industries (Lui, 2010; Priest 2014: 539), the arrival of
digital technologies stimulated new ideas and opened opportunities to
build a new and dynamic music industry. Many individuals and en-
terprises took advantage of the opportunities to distribute digitised
content through the internet and later, mobile technologies.
Government policy seems to have been generally favourable to-
wards innovations, delaying regulation until it was clearer whether
problems would emerge. The national copyright administration only
stepped in after legal battles over copyright infringement began to have
negative effects on the whole industry. Existing censorship mechan-
isms, implemented through a small number of publishers, importers or
distributors, were not effective in the emerging digital environment
with multiple channels for content creation and distribution. Digital
music posed particular problems as regulators found it difficult to tease
out the meaning of contents from the whole performance (interviews
with TenCent and Alibaba respondents). (Paradoxically the subsequent
restructuring of the industry around a few platforms created a context
that is far more amenable to administrative control and self-censor-
ship.)
With access to the new technologies in a liberal environment,
amateur musicians uploaded their songs onto the internet in search for
an audience. Perhaps foremost here is the case of Xue Chun (see box).8
Younger musicians in particular started to get involved, applying their
creativities to satisfy rising demands on the internet. They also became
involved in creating “network music” - background music for online
games, videos and other internet entertainment industries.
The case of Xue Chun: an amateur musician becomes a
multimedia star
A widely circulated story concerns the amateur musician,
Xue Chun, an ordinary person without any professional music
training. In 1995, he wrote a song, Northeast people are
Living Lei Feng (the household name of a hero in socialist
China)(东北人都是活雷锋). The song is easy to sing with a
humorous arrangement of tunes and an entertaining narrative
of the experiences of a truck driver in the Northeast region. It
remained unknown until 2001 when he decided to put it on a
website. It rapidly became a major hit without any profes-
sional promotion. The story was made into various online
flash animations. The song became very popular across the
country – and was seen as the first example of popular original
online music that became known as “network music”. A TV
drama series used the song as its theme music. The author
subsequently became a household name, enjoying fame not
only as a composer and singer but also as an actor and movie
producer.
This period saw the mushrooming of music-related online services
offering uploading, downloading, searching, collecting and streaming
of music. Initially small and medium enterprises launched websites
offering downloads of music and other cultural products, notably film.
They were closely followed by the large internet companies. Foremost
were the Chinese search engines like Baidu and Sogou which came to
play a key role in identifying pirate sites, publishing links (which
constantly changed to avoid IP enforcement) for users to download
pirated music. Baidu, China's largest search engine, launched its Baidu
MP3 search service in 2002 (Lui, 2010), with features that helped users
find the music they wanted, including Baidu 500, a list of the most
downloaded music (Dong and Jayakar, 2013).9
The result was a highly dynamic and diverse ecology. Various
players including software developers and equipment makers as well as
musicians (Tang and Lyons, 2017) entered the arena and pushed out
music apps and services. In this period, the digital online music space
was far from “stable”. No business made significant income (apart from
mobile phone service providers selling “ringtones”, a business based on
a very low unit price and a huge volume of users [Lui, 2010, Priest,
2014]).10 Because of piracy, the Chinese music industry had to identify
alternative sources of revenue to selling records, including income from
live performances, merchandising, brand sponsorship deals,
7 The weak development of China's music industry can be illustrated by
comparison with the UK. In 2014 there were 41,000 musicians in the UK
(source: https://www.statista.com/ sampled April 2017) compared to around
16,800 registered members of the Chinese Musicians Association (the body
established in 1949, which includes composers, singers, music critics, lyric
writers, educators, translators and music activity organisers). Though there are
no official statistics, industry estimates suggest that in 2017 60,000 in-
dependent performers were registered on the six online music sites and had
released more than 100,000 digital albums. These were previously mainly
amateur music enthusiasts (Chen, 2017)
8 Hou Yan, Sell feelings? Xue Cun make the movie “Northeast people are
living Lei Fengs”, December 13th 2016, http://ent.163.com/16/1213/08/
C85EVQ5F00038FO9.html (in Chinese) last accessed June 1st 2017.
9With between 10 and 15 million unlicensed music downloads per day via its
Baidu MP3 service, accounting for almost 80% of the music market in 2011,
Baidu was fiercely criticized by Western industry organisations such as the
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry and was subject to 84
cases in Chinese courts, seeking compensation of RMB 17.3 Million (Dong and
Jayakar 2013:88)
10 The mobile phone operators created the earliest charged services. China
Mobile's Migu service launched in 2002, China Telecom's i-music and Unicom's
Wo Music, charged users to download music for ringtones. These even by 2013
still accounted for the majority of revenue for digital music. The mobile op-
erators also offered data plans in partnership with digital music services such as
Xiami and TenCent (Xian 2014). The mobile companies were slow to develop a
wider range of services oriented towards users (Wang, 2017). Though China
Mobile set up a streaming service in 2015, they have not become major direct
players in the provision of digital music.
(https://www.chinatechnews.com/2015/11/04/22260-why-is-china-
mobile-forming-an-internet-company-now last sampled 25th July 2017)
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advertisement-funded music services (Lui, 2010). These services
broadly mirror, and indeed were often copied from, similar develop-
ments in the West. However in the West, actions by established music
industry players against Peer-to-Peer and other unlicensed down-
loading services kept these services in the informal economy and left
little space for legitimate businesses to emerge (Sun, 2016). In China
the internet became an arena for the integration of old and new busi-
ness operations in which innovation could flourish.11
China's huge and still growing base of netizens creates varied de-
mands for entertainment from users with differing backgrounds and
preferences. Music websites were prompted to develop diverse services
to meet these diverse needs. The People's Republic of China, Ministry of
Culture highlighted a surge in the number of new music websites which
increased from 452 to 695 between 2011 and 2013 (Ministry of Culture,
2012, 2014). Though these competing services copied Western models
and copied each other in terms of the applications and services offered,
this was only the start of a sustained innovation process.
4.3. Copyright enforcement and licensing provokes radical restructuring
In 2011–2, a series of changes in China's copyright environment had
dramatic consequences for the digital music sector. Previously en-
forcement of copyright protection regulations by the Chinese govern-
ment was limited by the weakness of the enforcement system and the
widespread practice and acceptance of piracy. As a result, copyrighted
content was freely distributed on the internet.12 This situation con-
tinued despite periodic compensation cases by rights owners. In parti-
cular, Baidu's MP3 search service had been sued several times by dif-
ferent organisations, including IFPI (in 2005), the Music Copyright
Society of China (in 2008), Universal, Sony BMG, and Warner Music (in
2008). These cases failed, mainly as Chinese courts accepted the “safe
harbour” rule that if search engines did not store infringing content on
their servers they would not be liable.
There was thus widespread surprise in 2011 when Baidu agreed an
out of court settlement for copyright infringement with the Western
record majors - Universal Music Group, Warner Music Group, and Sony
BMG for infringing their copyright (Dong and Jayakar, 2013) who, for
an estimated RMB 37 million (USD $5.7 million) signed a two-year deal
to license over 0.5 million songs from their catalogue. This develop-
ment was a combined product of a number of pressures: growing in-
ternational pressure on China to comply with World Trade Organisation
rules, tightening up of China's domestic internet regulations and
stronger Administrative Enforcement (in the face of pressure from
Western and domestic cultural industries), (Dong and Jayakar, 2013;
Street et al., 2015) coupled with a significant shift in Baidu's business
strategy (Dong and Jayakar, 2013). In that period, Baidu's dominant
position in digital music was being eroded by the proliferation of new
services. QQ music, set up by Ten Cent in 2004, had by then acquired
over 10 million users, closely followed by Xiami Music (9.5 Million) and
Douban FM (8M). Baidu saw an opportunity to gain market advantage
as the “only legal music distributor in China.” (Dong and Jayakar, 2013:
98). Some saw this as a turning point that “changed the whole eco-
system” in China.13 In particular, industry players realised that
copyright could be utilised as a tool for competing with their peers.
These developments were consolidated in 2012, with the third re-
vision of the Copyright Law of China in 21 years, and above all by the
decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of
31 August 2014 which led to the establishment of Intellectual Property
Courts in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. Under the new enforce-
ment regime, Internet platforms were forced to buy licenses for contents
and review materials before putting them online to ensure that all
contents on their platforms did not infringe copyright and the rights of
performance, broadcasting and other neighbouring rights. In July 2015,
the National Copyright Administration further ordered that all online
music service platforms must take down unauthorised music from their
platforms by 31st October 2015.
These developments triggered a process of rapid and far-reaching
restructuring and consolidation within the industry. Small and medium-
sized companies could not afford to pay for licensed content which,
given the continued prevalence of piracy, they could only subsequently
offer to consumers for free or at low price. This prompted a rapid
process of acquisition and merger in the creative cultural industries,
reinforced by powerful economies of scale, in which the cash rich BAT
‘internet giants’ became the dominant players.
By December 2016, the number of internet music users in Mainland
China had risen to 540 million (70.8% of all netizens).14 The pace of
online music development has been accelerated by the advanced state
of mobile technologies. China is becoming one of the global front-
runners in terms of 3G and 4G services and there has been rapid growth
in use of mobile devices, such as affordable smartphones. Digital music
services, initially based upon pcs, all migrated onto mobile devices.
Mobile access therefore figures strongly in China, particularly in the
youth market (21–30 year olds) (Xiang, 2014a). Numbers are still
growing, indicating the considerable potential of the online music
market (China Internet Network Information Center, 2016).15
5. The evolution of China's online music ecology
The development of online music in China was strongly patterned
by its historical context. First, the digital music business was a largely
‘greenfield development’16 (unlike the West, where powerful en-
trenched incumbents - the record companies, studios and other IP in-
termediaries - were determined to hold on to their position in the face
of potentially disruptive digitisation). The huge public appetite for
music and other cultural products attracted large numbers of new
players. Second, a liberal environment and lack of public support for
intellectual property protection allowed the emergence of novel ser-
vices (for example online Karaoke) that were at risk of infringing IP
protection rules. This unleashed a wave of experimentation and in-
novation in China's music industry that we described as “a hundred
11 Peer to Peer technologies arguably heralded a similar process of experi-
mentation in the West – most famously Napster. Though this was closed down
in 2002 as a result of copyright enforcement it culminated in new service de-
velopments like Spotify and other providers of music streaming services (Sun,
2016). The period of experimentation in China started later than (and is clearly
informed by experience of) their Western counterparts – but seems to be con-
tinuing relatively unabated.
12 A manager from TenCent, the biggest player, noted, “before 2013 there was
no copyright management mechanism installed in any music platforms.” (in-
terviewed, November 2016).
13 Andrew Chan, SVP, digital & strategic planning, Universal Music China,
commented: “The Baidu deal was the milestone that changed the whole
(footnote continued)
ecosystem. Since then the government has said that it is stepping up its com-
mitment to protecting intellectual property rights and that the development of
the music industry is a major priority.” IFPI (2014:36).
14 Analysys.cn, (10/4/2017) 2017 Annual analysis of Mobile Music Industry
in China, (in Chinese) https://www.analysys.cn/analysis/8/detail/1000720/
last sampled 5th May 2018.
15 Estimated user base of the top five digital music providers in China
(monthly active users) in order of size
Kugou 231 Million (acquired by TenCent)
QQ 165 Million TenCent
Kuwo 87 Million (acquired by Kugou then TenCent)
Netease 36 Million
Baidu 24 Million
Xiami 9 Million (acquired by AliBaba)
QuestMobile ‘2016 Q1 app report.’ QuestMobile 17th April 2016 http://
www.questmobile.cn/blog/blog-39.html sampled 30 May 2017.
16 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this interesting observation
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flowers blooming”. Third, government intervention shaped the land-
scape for innovation: initially providing a liberal environment and later
tightening up IP enforcement and further intervening to mitigate de-
structive competition for exclusive content licensing deals.
The recent measures adopted by the Chinese government to tighten
copyright protection prompted rapid and profound restructuring in the
music industry. SMEs struggled to find ways to cover the costs of fees
for distributing licensed content that was mainly provided to consumers
for little or no charge. They were taken over by larger organisations
with deep pockets, who could afford to build up libraries of licensed
content. Though in the West record companies, studios and other cul-
tural IP intermediaries were entrenched, in China these players were
weak or absent. In this context it was the BAT internet giants which
identified and seized new opportunities in the creative cultural sector
and came to play dominant roles.
Though Baidu, Alibaba and TenCent are all actively engaged with
music, literature and film distribution, their service development stra-
tegies have differed, shaped by their particular historical core busi-
nesses and distinctive strengths. We now briefly examine how each
player has been pursuing their own trajectories and strategies, building
upon their existing market position and capabilities, to explore new
opportunities and to strengthen positions in the Chinese market and to
respond to the challenges posed by its competitors.
6. Baidu
Baidu, by far the largest player at the outset, was the first of the BAT
players to engage with music services. Its successful Chinese search
engine, established in 2000, was one of those widely used to locate
pirate content. From 2004, use of its MP3 search service, providing
ready access to a virtually unlimited selection of unlicensed music,
grew rapidly to include a large share of the population.
In the aftermath of its landmark legal settlement, in October 2012, it
relaunched its music products as Baidu Music, with licensed music ra-
ther than MP3 search on the front page of its website “putting all the
legally available music on its various services into one place” (Custer,
2012). Its licensed services were based upon providing a share of ad-
vertising revenue to license holders on a per play/download basis.17
Baidu saw music services as a way to enlarge its base of internet users.
However it was less innovative and lost market share to the emerging
fremium music streaming services. In December 2015, Baidu Music
announced a merger with Taihe (太合) Music Group, a conglomerate of
pop record labels and publishers.18 They could be seen, in some sense,
as a ‘traditional’ player in China's music industry, with a catalogue of
700,000 songs around half the Chinese music market (Ingham, 2015;
PRNewswire, 2015; Tang and Lyons, 2017). It also appointed managers
with digital music backgrounds (from Douban and Netease) (Music
Business China, 2016).
7. Alibaba
Alibaba's core business is e-commerce, which made it at the outset
China's highest valued internet player. Alibaba explored the viability of
a wider range of online creative culture services, drawing on its role as
an e-commerce platform offering business services. In January 2013,
Alibaba Group had surprised many by announcing its acquisition of
China's 5th biggest digital music streaming service Xiami music. Xiami
(or little shrimp -虾米音乐), was a platform targeted towards individual
musicians, founded in 2007 by a former Alibaba programmer/analyst
(Shen, 2013). The subsequent acquisition in December 2013 of the
TTPOD music-streaming app (TianTianDongTing天天动听) led some to
suggest that Alibaba was taking over the music industry (Dredge, 2016;
Kaufman, 2013). These were merged in 2015 into a new division: Ali-
baba Music Group (阿里音乐). Music sector players (Gao Xiaosong,
onetime singer-songwriter and Song Ke, a former executive with
Warner Music) were brought in as chairman and CEO respectively
(Flanagan, 2015).
Though Alibaba moved earlier in responding to the new licensing
market, it was TenCent that made the most decisive interventions, as
we will see below. Though Alibaba responded to developments by
Tencent and other players with a comparable range of free and sub-
scription services, Alibaba has developed a more distinctive strategy in
its focus on creator services, like “Xiami yinyueren” [虾米音人]
(“shrimp musician” in Chinese), aimed at fostering grass-root devel-
opment of musicians and targeting not only reputed musicians but also,
increasingly, unknown and would-be musicians. Its initial services al-
lowed people to register as independent musicians and upload their
new pieces and/or demos online. Gradually, these services expanded
and were adjusted to meet local needs. Each registered independent
musician is allocated a domain name and webpage. On this dedicated
space, musicians can present new work and share albums with their
registered fans in return for getting feedback and comments. This kind
of service is termed “Zaoxin” (造新) novelty creation. For example, in
2014, Xiami launched a programme - “looking for unseen originality”
(寻光计划) – deliberately designed to help unknown, amateur or new
musicians bring out their debut albums to a wide audience. It has
published 13 dedicated albums for these new artists, who have, from
being unknown, become popular in China and well recognised in the
music field.19 Since becoming part of AliBaba in 2015, Xiami Music has
continued to focus on serving “unseen/undiscovered talents” and has
stepped up the activities of this musician platform. The new artists and
their albums have been praised for their originality and quality.20
Building upon this, Alibaba launched an integrated platform – Ali
Planet in 2016.21 This brings in elements of Alibaba's Taobao e-com-
merce platform with its core mission of providing business opportu-
nities for small and medium-sized companies. Four of Xiami's founders
had worked for AliBaba and were familiar with its Taobao model. Ali-
Planet promotes a range of music related activities outwith streaming,
including online promotion of music contents, sale of merchandising
and other related products (e.g. album cover design tools). This in-
cludes front and backstage services to assist creators for example with
music recording, stage concert organisation, and live broadcasting on-
line. As well as offering opportunities for potential and unknown ta-
lents, it also creates business opportunities for professional music stu-
dios and live concert organisers. TenCent likewise announced its own
“Musician (音乐人in Chinese) Plan” in 2017 to attract more grassroots
musicians and composers to its platforms, after experimenting with
platforms for independent musicians for several years.22
17 Kaiser Kuo, Baidu director of international communications, stated: “Baidu
has an ad-funded model and our core strategy is based on online advertising
and dominating at consumers' main points of entry to the internet.” (IFPI
2014:36–7).
18 Taihe Entertainment Group was a leading Chinese independent record
label that owned two leading Chinese pop music labels (Taihe Rye Music, Ocean
Butterflies Music) and Touch Music Publishing (Ingham 2015).
19 http://www.xiami.com/collect/40906776 last sampled 2 August 2017
20 http://science.china.com.cn/2015-05/20/content_7919304.htm last sam-
pled 2 August 2017
21 Alibaba Music have upgraded their music streaming service with a new
online platform - Alibaba Planet - to connect fans and performers. Jacca-Route,
“Alibaba Music Connecting Fans and Artists With New Planet App”, Digital
Music News 21 April 2016 http://routenote.com/blog/alibaba-music-
connecting-fans-and-artists-with-new-platform/ last accessed 11 May 2017
22 Cussion Pang, chief executive officer of TenCent Music Entertainment
group, stated: “Our goal is to ensure that original music composers and musi-
cians on our platforms would have earned a total income of 500 million yuan
(US$74 million) in three years,” (Jing, 2017), ‘TenCent banks on original music
to become China's Spotify’, South China Morning Post, 24th July 2017, sampled
31st July 2017 http://www.scmp.com/tech/enterprises/article/2103911/
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8. TenCent
TenCent's free instant messaging service WeChat, launched in 1999,
attracted around 300 Million users in only two years and became the
foundation for a huge range of services (China Internet Watch, 2014).
In 2004, TenCent launched its QQ music platform. Building on these
popular services it developed a profitable online games business and
subsequently launched a stream of interactive entertainment services.
Its subsequent success in combining free and subscription services
across its growing range of services – most notably online games and
mobile applications - allowed it to catch up with Baidu and Alibaba
(Hariharan, 2017). By 2015 had become the 2nd biggest player in
music streaming services with an estimated 15% of China's digital music
streaming market (Osawa, 2014). In a further dramatic development, in
July 2016, TenCent established itself as by far the largest player
amongst online music platforms in China through a merger involving
acquisition of over 60% of the shares of China Music Corporation
(CMC). CMC had in 2015 acquired China's largest music service pro-
vider Kugou (酷狗) with around 28% of the market and the 3rd largest
player Kuwo (酷我) with 13% market share (All Tech Asia, 2017; China
Internet Watch, 2014).
TenCent has developed a distinctive strategy – launching services
with simple interfaces, broadly similar across many applications, fo-
cusing on building markets (especially attracting users by imitating
successful products and adjusting them to improve user experience)
rather than establishing income streams (China Internet Watch, 2014).
Given the prevalence of pirated music in China, consumer services
typically feature “free music”. People continue to be able to retrieve
downloads from many websites at no cost. This creates a challenge for
service providers as it limits their scope to charge for access. TenCent
was particularly determined to make its music services profitable (in-
terview with TenCent 2016), though its initial fee-paying services were
not successful.23 As in the West, digital music companies sought to
attract and keep users with ‘fremium’ services combining free and paid
for services – in particular by launching low-cost subscription services.
Subscription fees are in the range of 10RMB (equivalent to £1 sterling,
April 2016 values) to 19RMB per month – approximately an order of
magnitude lower than in the West.
Users increasingly access music through mobile devices. However,
in China, mobile data charges are relatively high. For example, 1G of
mobile data costs 50RMB (equivalent to £5 sterling, April 2016 figures).
This could be used up quickly if listening to music online on the move.
One consequence is that all mobile software applications can also be
used in a Wi-Fi environment. People can download content when they
have access to Wi-Fi e.g. in fixed locations at home or work so they have
a selection of music to listen to on the move (an exigency that means
that streaming does not entirely displace downloading).24 To reduce
consumer costs, the internet companies have made deals with internet
service providers to cover the cost of mobile data usage. Thus TenCent's
QQ music has a music subscription service for 15 RMB per month which
includes a bundling deal for mobile data access with China Mobile
whereby they receive 5-6RMB - keeping 9-10RMB for itself.
To increase uptake of its premium services for fee-paying users,
TenCent has bundled in a variety of other services, offering, including,
variously:
• better sound quality;• immediate access to newly-released albums; and,• access to online broadcasts of live concerts of popular musicians.
Other streaming services offered similar arrays of services to fee-
paying users.
The digital music companies have launched various other kinds of
offering in a process of sustained experimentation. This includes, for
example, allowing fans to follow their favourite celebrities online and
giving them exclusive tickets for live events. Though these are targeted
to subscribers, non-fee paying members who do not have the money or
are unwilling to pay, are still able to access the content if they can wait
for a week or so and do not mind the lower quality of the music re-
cording, or are willing to earn credits (see below).
The evolution of China's online music ecosystem is summarised in
Fig. 1 (below). The timeline highlights how the liberal ‘hundred
flowers’ environment gave way with stricter licensing enforcement
from 2012 to 5 to a more stable environment in which Baidu, Alibaba
and TenCent have become the dominant social media platforms in
music (and elsewhere) by acquiring smaller start-ups with their music
specialists and user bases.
There are many other players however. The largest independent is
Netease (网易), originally a Chinese Internet technology company,
which recently (April 2017) secured substantial venture capital finan-
cing (RMB 750 Million) for its NetEase Music Cloud (网易云音乐).25
8.1. Learning by competing: creating and navigating a rapidly changing
ecology
As shown in the preceding section, players deployed different stra-
tegies, building on their historical context and capabilities, to pursue
market growth and potential (subscription or advertising) revenue by
launching diverse services variously targeted at creators as well as
consumers; at different ways of valorising music (advertising/sub-
scription); at different consumer segments (e.g. for new or specialised
content); at different ways of consuming music and in diverse forms
(e.g. audio-visual).
The major players eye each other closely. Their strategies are visibly
shaped by the interactions between them: strategic moves by one player
triggering responses by others through imitative attempts to catch up or
by differentiation – involving fierce competition and at times also col-
laboration. Though this account focuses on competition in music, the
competitive struggles between BAT have been waged across digital
music, film, video, literature and games.26
Having achieved leadership in digital streaming services, TenCent
started to acquire exclusive music distribution rights, particularly from
overseas record labels (Owsinski, 2015). In 2014, it signed deals with
record companies, such as Sony Music and Warner Music, to exclusively
distribute their content on the QQ music platform in China (Cookson,
2014).27 Its competitors followed suit. AliBaba responded in 2015 by
establishing a Music Division and signing exclusive licensing agree-
ments with BMG (the world's fourth biggest music rights company, with
(footnote continued)
TenCent-banks-original-music-become-chinas-spotify(original article title
‘TenCent to shake up the market for music’)
23 Thus TenCent's green diamond - the most popular paid-for digital music
service – charges 10RMB per month 114RMP p.a. (2016 figures) and was es-
timated in 2015 to have 3 million subscribers (IFPI, 2015). Baidu's advertise-
ment-free “VIP” streaming service also costs 10 RMB/month (Millward, 2015).
Price and features of the main subscription services are summarised in Tang and
Lyons (2017:12 Table 2).
24 As well as the price, uneven access to mobile data services meant that users
might cache 30–50 songs on their mobile phones from streaming services for
“listening on the go”. (Matthew, 2015)
25 https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/netease-cloud-music#/entity
and http://istock.jrj.com.cn/article,yanbao,30086488.html last sampled 2
August 2017
26 For example TenCent's deals with western music companies were matched
by similar agreements with Hollywood studies (Cookson, 2014; Osawa, 2015).
27 ‘TenCent to merge QQ Music service with China Music Corp to create
streaming giant’ South China Morning Post 15 July 2016 http://www.scmp.
com/business/companies/article/1990254/TenCent-merge-qq-music-service-
china-music-corp-create-streaming last sampled 11 May 2017. See also Osawa
(2014), Cookson (2014), Music Business Worldwide (2015).
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over 2.5 Million copyrights) and Universal Music Group (Music
Business Worldwide, 2015). Though this was ‘a drop in the bucket’
(Owsinski, 2015) compared to pirate sites or QQ Music's armoury of 15
million pieces of licensed music, AliBaba was able to exercise compe-
titive power in the music market because of the quality of the music in
its listings which included for example the Rolling Stones.
This struggle to sign exclusive rights marks a qualitative shift in the
character of competition for music access. What had previously re-
volved around allowing easy access to the widest possible selection
shifted to providing exclusive access to what Alex Taggart, from China
Music consultancy Outdustry Group, described as “weaponised” music
(Tang and Lyons, 2017: 12) that the platforms “couldn't afford to lose”
(cited in Horwitz, 2015). In this period platforms began suing other
platforms for distributing songs they had acquired licenses for (Horwitz,
2015).28 Licensing thus shifted the focus of competition from the ‘body’
to the ‘head’ of the long-tailed music market. By offering exclusive
access to music that was trending, the platforms were competing to
build their customer bases and promote uptake of subscription services
(even temporary exclusive distribution agreements would attract sub-
scribers seeking access to new releases before pirated copies became
available). While users of free services could afford to sign up to mul-
tiple services, paying subscribers needed to discriminate: consumers
would select services that offered the particular music they wanted at a
cost they could afford.
The competition for exclusive deals drove up the cost of licensing
contents, particularly from overseas record labels. Though initial at-
tempts to dampen down competition between Alibaba and TenCent
were not successful (China Music Business, 2016), by the time of our
second round of fieldwork at the end of 2016, the main players had
come to the view that this competitive strategy was “un-
sustainable”(TenCent Legal consultant, interviewed 9 December-2016).
The deals that were signed, for example, between TenCent and
Warner Music, unusually allowed the internet companies to negotiate
licensing deals with local Chinese music services (in contrast to the rest
of the world where labels license their music directly to music services)
(Cookson, 2014). The platforms have begun to sub-license their content
(e.g. TenCent offered part of its catalogue to the smaller service Duomi)
(Tang and Lyons, 2017). As the result of direct state intervention, the
big players like TenCent Music agreed to sub-license their contents
acquired from overseas record companies to other platforms to avoid a
bidding war in the industry (discussion at project final workshop,
Beijing, April 2017).
8.2. New service developments on multilayer cross-platform service
infrastructure
A wide spectrum of services has emerged in China's music space.
They are highly differentiated and change in form and scope over time.
Many of these elements (including use of pirated copies of software)
were copied from the West. However the overarching pattern of sus-
tained experimentation differentiates China from other economies. The
internet companies are seeking to find ways of engaging with the fullest
range of targeted audiences – including those with limited current
ability/willingness to spend. With free registration, users can access the
same music collections that the platform will give its paid subscribers,
though they may have to wait for a week or two for new releases.
Various kinds of premium service (e.g. tickets for live performances or
meeting with celebrity musicians/singers) may be offered as paid op-
tions for non fee-paying users. The companies are finding ways to in-
centivise and valorise engagement with their platforms and services.
Every registered user can accumulate credit points by contributing to
the services in a variety of ways including simply visiting platforms
daily, using music apps, providing lyrics, translating lyrics from a for-
eign language into Chinese, introducing friends, and linking bank in-
formation with the registered account. Overall, the more active and
committed you are to the platform, the more credits you can collect.
These credits have real monetary value and can be used for shopping
directly online.29
Services were shaped by spillover from related sectors. The early
commercial success of online music show platforms shows like YY and
9158, which became unexpectedly lucrative after they introduced vir-
tual gifts that audience members could buy for performers, prompted
similar offerings from internet companies including TenCent (Xiang,
2014b).30
The commercial success of online services and the established po-
pularity of Karaoke in China tempted many online platforms to offer
online Karaoke services, such as QQ Music “All-People's Karaoke” (全民
K歌). Extended Karaoke services emerged offering emulated
Fig. 1. Evolution of the online music industry in China 1999–2016
28 Thus in November 2014, TenCent sued Netease; in December 2014 Kugou
sued Netease and in May 2015 Alibaba sued Kugou (Horwitz, 2015).
29 https://www.zhihu.com/question/34100979. (in Chinese) posted
7.5.2016. last sampled 2 August 2017
30 For example, in the 2nd quarter of 2016, YY Music's 600,000 paying users
spent an average of 269 RMB on virtual gifts (a total of $28 million). (Xiang,
2013)
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performance environments (for example indoor or outdoor perfor-
mances, in small or large concert auditoria), together with additional
functions to help singers improve the quality of their performance - for
example by editing multiple versions of their singing. Karaoke singing
performances are shared within a group of friends or wider community
who may rate them and even send a “gift” (free or paid for by listeners)
back to the performer to show their appreciation. The revenue is then
shared between the platform and the performers. Online karaoke ser-
vices like Changba allowed individuals to record and share their per-
formances, and uses gamification - such as local charts and competi-
tions between singers - to engage users (Xiang, 2013).
These developments arguably provided a template (including va-
lorisation models) for the emergence of a range of services based upon
the creation of online communities linking consumers together and
bringing them together with creators. Parallel developments have
emerged in digital music services. Xiami music offers a music billboard
service on which users collect their current favourite songs or albums
and comment on and grade singers or songs. This also records in-
formation about an individual user's preferences for music, and in turn
provides recommendations of songs that users may be interested in and
artists they might follow. The billboard service has become a ‘public
space’ where musicians can introduce their debut demos and albums to
listeners before publishing them. The public space leads to the forma-
tion of virtual communities for music lovers to share their favourite
music pieces amongst those with similar tastes. Technically, the plat-
form can help users find each other by knowing their downloads and
their comments and rating of the music pieces. This function has been
promoted by the Xiami music platform with the label “sharing the same
rotten taste” (臭味相投): a humorous way to describe the like-minded.
As with early music streaming services in the West, users within
communities share each other's album folders. Other services offered
include for example “Xiami loops” (virtual spaces online), in which
groups of users can gather at a particular time and organise a forum to
discuss a particular topic or host a concert by one of the users, to in-
troduce his/her favourite music pieces selectively (like a DJ), and set
the stage by inviting comments and views from attendees. Through
these activities, individuals can gradually build a reputation within the
group/community, playing a role like music critics. The online “loops”
(forums and concerts) with specially selected themes attract the at-
tention of artists and celebrities, particularly when hosted by “online
music critics” with a reputation. When professionals and musicians take
part in these events, the events add further values to all attendees, for
example, co-generating new meanings to existing works.
TenCent representatives, in our second round of fieldwork in
November 2016, highlighted how they had created a novel income
stream from fans' gifts to their favourite artists. During recent online
broadcasts of live concerts, fans were able to send virtual gifts to the
performers. A large image of the gift, such as “a luxury car”, would be
simultaneously displayed on a big screen at the back of the stage, where
the names of the donors were also shown. There are several examples of
this kind of gift scheme run by many internet platforms for entertain-
ment services. Users can send virtual gifts to praise artists or perfor-
mers. The virtual gifts can be symbolic with no monetary value and/or
purchased with real money - in which case recipients can cash the
money. The platform and performers share the income from the virtual
gifts (Interview with TenCent music, November 2017). These formed
the basis of a lucrative, burgeoning ‘fan-economy’ (Liang and Shen,
2016).
These various services have the effect of linking consumers together
and linking them in many different ways to creators and to the digital
platforms. This creates a method to collect information and sentiment
that have value to the parties involved. This web of services is crucial to
understanding how the financial viability of services may be estab-
lished.
BAT were rich with cash from their highly profitable core businesses
(and did not need venture capital). Our industry interviewees indicated
that the large internet companies are not expecting their investment in
music services to be profitable in the foreseeable future. For example
AliMusic staff were told that they had 7 years to build their industry.
This long-term perspective enabled the emergence of a wide range, and
numerous configurations, of services directed towards consumers as
well as creators. Though protected in the short term, these operations
arise within organisations that are subject to fiscal discipline. The issue
will be posed at some stage of how digital music services can become
financially sustainable. Not many of the customer services we reviewed
directly generate profit. There is significant revenue from advertise-
ments (which are substantial in the huge Chinese market) but this is
unlikely to suffice in the face of rising licensing fees.
In 2016, TenCent's digital music general manager Wu Weilin an-
nounced at a digital music media event that “QQ music has been
profitable.”31 Though confirmed by our respondents,32 given the com-
plexity of revenue accounting, many specialists in the field raised
doubts about the claim. Though precise figures are not available we can
offer a broad estimate. There are around 10 million fee-paying users out
of 400 million registered customers using TenCent's music service. In-
come from adverts on website pages and mobile apps brings in about
50% of the revenue . The rest is from the sales of special albums,
membership subscription fees, and tickets for live concerts and online
broadcasting of live concerts, and similar activities (interview with
TenCent Music November 2016).
The incentive for the internet giants to invest in music and other
cultural content production and distribution has been to attract users
and keep them active on the platforms. Thus Baidu respondents saw the
retention of their music business as crucial regardless of whether it
brings in income revenue or not. “You have to know, for us, internet
business is ‘liuliang’ [流量, meaning “the volume of data flow”] “liu-
liang” brings us users that we have to focus on… in music, we have
been burning moneys [sic], lots of them…”. (Baidu manager inter-
viewed December 2015).
TenCent managers expressed a similar view: “Music is a very im-
portant part of peoples' life. An internet company like us had to do
music and to engage with people for profit or not” (TenCent respondent
interviewed November 2016). According to our respondent from Ali
Entertainment management, ‘We did not make a profit for many years at
the start of the platform for e-commerce business, it was the future that our
CEO, Ma Yun, foresaw. Ali Music is still young. We may follow the same line
as we did before. We are not under any pressure from the top to make a
profit. We are now concentrating on creating service platforms for people to
come to us. It may take as long as we need, five years, or seven...’ (Alibaba
manager interviewed 2016).
Tang and Lyons (2017) suggest that these developments may con-
stitute an alternative model to the digital music value chains estab-
lished in the West. They differ from the conventional investors who
drove specialised digital music services elsewhere in that: “their interest
in music services is not solely directed at profits; instead, these music services
are combined with their other services (e-commerce, search, social messa-
ging, games) to create synergies within their own corporate structures.”
(Tang and Lyons 2017: 17).
By weaving together a wide range of online services across the di-
gital economy, including e-commerce services and their own payment
systems, across a range of cultural industries as well as their digital
music services, the BAT internet giants in China have been able to es-
tablish cross-sector platform infrastructures through which an array of
different value propositions can be simultaneously exploited. In con-
trast to existing studies of the role of technology platforms in double-
sided markets (see for example Gawer, 2014), these players are
31 Quoted at http://business.sohu.com/20161010/n469887776.shtml (in
Chinese) posted 10 Oct 2016, last sampled 2 August 2017
32 Interview with TenCent music in November 2016, Beijing and discussions
with participant at final workshop Beijing 6 April 2017
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leveraging an increasingly rich array of diffuse value streams through
multi-sided markets (encompassing for example not just creators and
consumers but a range of intermediaries – publishers, venues, financial
and e-commerce services). In the West these value propositions have to
date mainly been explored within industry sectors, defended by en-
trenched intermediaries (record companies, studios, banks, retailers). In
China the internet companies seem to have been able to expand and
integrate their services rather more freely across sectoral boundaries.
This has, critically, allowed BAT to extract value from a user engaging
in one service not only in that service but across an array of more or less
adjacent markets and services (whether music, games, e-commerce, or
payment systems).
Fig. 2 seeks to illustrate this process. It shows how, through the
integration of services across different platforms, the BAT internet
giants have each created their own cross-platform service infrastructure
which can capture multiple value propositions (both through direct
monetisation and through aggregating volumes of user data and en-
gagements). It shows how these strategies operate at (at least) three
levels:
8.2.1. Within cultural industry sectors
‘Vertical’ integration within sectors such as digital music, which
allows sales of complementary products and services (e.g. merchan-
dising) and closer engagement with and better understanding of the
dynamics of these highly uncertain long-tailed markets (Anderson,
2006).
8.2.2. ‘Lateral’ Integration between cultural industry sectors
Vertical integration is complemented by ‘lateral integration’ to ex-
ploit synergies between cultural sectors (e.g. trading upon reputations
of works and performers in adjacent markets).
8.2.3. ‘Horizontal’ Integration at the platform level
Attracting huge and growing numbers of users onto their platforms
brings income from advertising and from bringing customers onto their
commercial platforms and payment systems, as well as other kinds of
value they may seek to obtain from the big data accumulated.
9. Conclusion
Our analysis highlights the extended process of experimentation and
‘learning by doing’ (Sørensen, 1996; Williams et al., 2005) through
which these players identify, elaborate and test these opportunities at
scale, in practice with real producers and consumers. In this sense,
China has become a “laboratory” for service and business model
experimentation. We also emphasise the role of the powerful inter-
mediaries at the heart of multiple digital service ecosystems which not
only opens up a wider array of service and value propositions but can
lead to radically different outcomes from the West where developments
have been patterned by deeply entrenched and industrially segmented
value chains (Thompson, 2016).
We have seen how in China, the absence/weakness of record com-
panies and other traditional intermediaries created a space in which the
BAT internet giants identified and seized new opportunities in the
creative cultural sector and came to play dominant roles. These com-
panies, cash rich due to their established core businesses, launched a
flood of new service offerings. Many of these elements (e.g. fremium
services) also arose in the West. Though perhaps initially imitations, we
see their adaptation, further elaboration and recombination in China,
leading to a remarkable variety and density of interwoven services. By
integrating services across different cultural content sectors (music,
film/TV, literature, games) and in lateral markets (online markets,
payment systems) Baidu, Alibaba and TenCent have each created a
cross-platform service infrastructure through which they can capture
multiple value propositions.
Our empirical analysis highlighted differences as well as common-
alities between the three, readily related to their historical core busi-
nesses, their strategic manoeuvres and the interactions between them
resulted in different evolving configurations of capacities, services and
markets. Intense competition between these major players provoked
massive investments, particularly in acquiring content, driven by the
perceived strategic imperative to maximise their presence in a key
market and increase their already large customer base. These moves
were made at a time when these firms were not able to demonstrate a
prospective return on investment (whether in terms of advertising
revenue, sales of subscriptions for paid music services, ancillary income
e.g. from merchandising and ticket sales). Despite some stabilisation
and convergence as particular service configurations and models be-
come established and demonstrate their viability, competition con-
tinues to drive dynamic processes of innovation in China's digital en-
vironment.
China's music and other digital creative industries have in con-
sequence followed a distinctive trajectory.33 The outcomes are likely to
differ significantly from the models that have emerged and became
dominant in Western contexts controlled by powerful record labels with
huge IP rights holdings. Developments in China, where record labels
Fig. 2. Cross-platform service infrastructures to capture multiple value propositions
33 See the comment by the deputy director of the research centre for Chinese
Internet+ Association, on the media, http://news.pedaily.cn/201804/430060.
shtml (in Chinese) last accessed May 3rd 2018.
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were weak and where the technology platforms have come to play a key
role, may constitute an alternative model (Tang and Lyons, 2017) and
offer a strikingly different pathway for the evolution of digital music
and other cultural content services. Players outside China may wish to
explore the applicability of the models emerging in China for their own
settings.
We conclude that the “disassembly and reassembly” processes de-
scribed by Mangematin et al. (2014) are taking place in China's digital
creative industries. However, they exhibit sharply differing (processual)
dynamics and (substantive) outcomes under these radically different
circumstances.
Substantively: with few established service models and only weak
institutional templates, Chinese players drew extensively from a range
of Western digital business and service models. However they have
adapted them selectively to their own business contexts, recombining
and progressively extending them to create radically different config-
urations. Such ‘realisation of new combinations’ of already existing
ideas, reconfigured and combined with the entrepreneur's own novel
ideas are of course at the heart of Schumpeter's (1912: 159) ground-
breaking definition of innovation (Kurz, 2012). As a result, these mi-
metic processes (and coercive isomorphic pressures from the globalised
licensing system) have not to date resulted in convergence with the
West (c.f. Di Maggio and Powell, 1991).
Processually: our study confirms Thompson and Macmillan's (2010)
suggestion that discovery driven approaches (see also McGrath, 2010)
may be needed in uncertain and emerging contexts. Though Thompson
and Macmillan (2010) suggest that risk may be mitigated by launching
services inexpensively and redirecting them in the light of experience,
in China's current hyperturbulent context, these processes of experi-
mentation and ‘trial and error’ learning (Sosna et al., 2010) take a very
different form. Seeking to develop and exploit customer linkages across
multiple markets and services, BAT have launched and further in-
novated services at scale – turning China into a laboratory for devel-
oping and realising business innovations. We find evidence of what
Aldrich and Fiol (1994: 666) described as “meaning making on a grand
scale”. The commanding heights of China's digital economy are char-
acterised not by risk avoidance but by a more aggressive learning
economy, combining pace and scale through the proliferation of full-
scale business launches and sustained innovation. Similar observations
have been made in relation to other sectors including renewable energy
(Korsnes, 2015). We must reconsider prevalent accounts of China as “a
nation of copycats” (Thompson, 2016: 1). Thomson argues (2016: 10)
that China's current high tech boom has generated, as well as tolerance
of risk, “manic and fierce competition”, illustrated by the emergence of
thousands of Uber-like services in China compared to the handful ty-
pically emerging in Western economies.
Our explanation of why differences in China's institutional setting
generated such distinctive competitive dynamics in the digital cultural
industries highlights a number of linked factors: the absence of en-
trenched music labels and studios within the sectors; the weak
boundaries around and between sectors; the arrival of new entrants (the
cash-rich BAT social media platforms) and the fierce competition that
ensued between Baidu, Alibaba and TenCent to secure market share
across many overlapping markets; in previously under-developed cul-
tural product markets that were growing rapidly to meet unfulfilled
demand. The result was a system that is far from equilibrium. This
observation calls into question the applicability of institutionalist
models based upon presumptions of stabilisation and equilibrium
(Meyer et al., 2005). Thus the development of digital music in China did
not correspond to ecosystem models derived from established business
in the West (Tang and Lyons, 2017).
Different conceptual frameworks and methodologies are needed to
capture developments in turbulent settings that are far from equili-
brium (Lewin and Volberda, 1999; Meyer et al., 2005). In addressing
these, our study identified and exploited striking conceptual and
methodological synergies between neo-institutional accounts of
emerging sectors and ‘fields in flux’ and contributions from STS that,
from the outset, have emphasised the need to encompass symmetrically
both hot (dynamic) and cold (stable) settings. Both traditions have
emphasised processual accounts, based on triangulating multiple
sources including qualitative methods (e.g. ethnographic interviews)
rather than the structured quantitative methods traditionally preferred
by institutionalists for testing variance theories (Meyer et al., 2005;
Shaw and Allen, 2016).
Calls by many of these writers for multi-level and multi-temporal
investigation to achieve an evolutionary account from institutionalist
writers (Lewin and Volberda, 1999; Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Meyer et al.,
2005; Mangematin et al., 2014), are mirrored by parallel methodolo-
gical developments in STS. The latter, described as ‘strategic ethno-
graphy’, calls for a detailed longitudinal focus on an array of key actors
interacting in historically shaped arenas. Our analysis addresses how
they are configured - constrained and enabled - by their historical
context and also how their strategies and interactions between them
may reconfigure this context and enable different pathways and tra-
jectories to emerge (Hyysalo et al., 2018; Pollock and Williams, 2009).
9.1. Observations on this research, limitations and future opportunities
We have provided some insights into the opening scenes in an en-
ormously complex and rapidly changing context. Our exploratory re-
search strategy provided effective tools for gaining insights in this
highly turbulent setting, tracking changes in services, business strate-
gies and the understandings of the players involved. Some service ele-
ments identified in our initial round of fieldwork had already been
revised less than a year later. For example, the government is currently
encouraging the key players towards more “collaborative competition”
in place of the fierce “zero-sum” competition for exclusive licensing
deals that recently prevailed.
This exploratory study of an emerging ecology was limited in
duration and scope (focused around the key BAT players). More robust
understanding could be achieved by extending the depth, breadth and
duration of enquiry. The methodology adopted did not allow the in-
sights into specific organisation processes that might be afforded, for
example, by more detailed ethnographic case-study of a particular or-
ganisation. A key limitation was that it was not feasible to undertake
primary research into the (crucially important) experience of music
creators and consumers.
We have charted some opening scenes in the emergence of China's
digital music ecology. Processes of experimentation and longer-term
distributed “social learning” (Sørensen, 1996) will continue as China's
cultural industries and legal system evolve. We see this exploratory
study as the starting point for a longer term programme of investiga-
tion. By extending this study we hope to track the further evolution of
the sector and the unfolding biography (Hyysalo et al., 2018) of China's
digital cultural industries.
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Appendix A
Table
(Anonymised) interviewees and rolesa.
Companies Interviewees Date
1 Ali picture Legal general counsel (15-04-2016)
2 Alibaba (Beijing office)b 1) Digital platform senior expects, the Research Institute for cross- border e-commerce; 2) operational
expert, Legal Dep of Alibaba Group
(16-12-2015)
3 Alibaba headquarters (Hangzhou) GC, Entertainment platform (04-06-2016)
4 Alibaba literatureb 1) Legal GC; 2) Editor (14-04-2016)
5 Alibaba music Legal expert (14-04-2016)
6 Baidu Baidu International Government Affairs (14-12-2015)
7 Baidu Product manager (Beijing) (16-04-2016)
8 Beijing Academy of Social Sciences Media Research Institute (21-04-2016)
9 Beijing IP Court 1) Deputy president; 2) copyright judge (16-04-2016)
10 Bird&Bird Lawyer (12-04-2016)
11 Blue Ocean Networks Beijing Hollywood producer (30-01-2016)
12 Bridge Picture Ltd. Hong Kong Film producer, Founding Partner, CEO. Previously producer for HK GreatWall Film, Sil Methopole
Organisation Ltd.
(11-11-2016)
13 CCTV (China Central Television) TV producer (04-12-2015)
14 China Copyright Protection Center Deputy director (12-04-2016)
15 China Copyright Protection Center Legal expert (separate interview from the above one) (12-04-2016)
16 China Entertainment Lawyer (14-03-2016)
17 China Media Managementb 1) Director; 2) expert (25-03-2016)
18 China Reading Limitedb 1) Senior legal director;2) Chief legal advisor (23-04-2016)
19 China-Britain Business Council Sector head creative industries; (03-05-2016)
20 Chinese Academy of Science, Institute for Policy
Management
Associate professor specialised in IP issues (15-04-2016)
21 Chinese association of audio and video works of
collective management
Deputy secretary general (19-04-2016)
22 Communication University of China Professor, music and recording school (23-04-2016)
23 Communication University of Chinab 1) Professor in literature and law; 2) Director of Cyberspace Law and Intellectual Property Study Centre;
3) Expert in copyright division, University Press; 4) Editor-in-Chief, Editorial Dept., University Press
(16-12-2015)
24 Curiosity China Managing director (31-03-2016)
25 European Patent Office Director (18-12-2015)
26 Flightmoon Media (part of Huairun Media Group) Screen writer (26-04-2016)
27 Former high level official in Ministry of
Commerce, Leader (to be) of IP Law in China
Visiting professor, Tsinghua University Law School, former Deputy director general, Department of
Treaty and Law, Ministry of Commerce
(17-12-2015)
28 Hangzhou Yinghua Yiping Film and Television
Media Company
Chairman of the Board and Art Director (05-04-2016)
29 Hogan Llovels Lawyer (14-12-2015)
30 Huayi Brothers Media Corp General counsel (legal) (01-06-2017)
31 Innovation Incubator Director (26-01-2016)
32 Intl. Federation of Phonographic Industry Beijingb 1) Expert-1; 2) Expert-2 (20-04-2016)
33 IP Key Team leader (29-01-2016)
34 IP Key -EU-China New Intellectual Property
Cooperationb
1) Team leader; 2) Technical Expert (18-12-2015)
35 IPR EU SME Helpdesk Lawyer (28-03-2016)
36 iQiyi Senior legal director (20-04-2016)
37 iResearch President (23-04-2016)
38 Irish Times Hollywood reporter (27-03-2016)
39 LeTVb 1)Legal general council (GC); 2) legal assistant, legal department (15-12-2015)
40 Metis IP Lawyer (26-01-2016)
41 MIGU Co., Ltd. Deputy president (23-04-2016)
42 Ministry of Finance The office for cultural enterprises (14-04-2016)
43 Ministry of Industry and Information Technology Industrial culture development center, (19-04-2016)
44 Outdustry Music Rights Expert (11-04-2016)
45 PAE Pictures Director (31-03-2016)
46 Penguin China Director (29-02-2016)
47 Phoenix Inspivision Director (28-04-2016)
48 PKU Law School IP professor (21-12-2015)
49 Sino-EU film festival Expert (27-03-2016)
50 Tencent (Beijing office) Head of general legal affairs, Tencent research institute (09-11-2016)
51 Tencent Academy Deputy director (18-04-2016)
52 Tencent Academy Legal expert (18-04-2016)
53 Tencent Rights Protecting Center Director (23-04-2016)
54 The International Publishers Copyright Protection
Coalition in China (“IPCC”)
Senior president (14-04-2016)
55 Trade Section EU Delegation to China IP Director (05-04-2016)
56 UK Embassy IP Attaché (27-01-2016)
57 Universal Music China Expert (21-03-2016)
58 US Embassy IP Attaché (10-03-2016)
59 Zhongnan University of Economics and Law Associate professor (23-04-2016)
a All names are anonymised in accordance with agreed consent arrangements.
b More than two participants present.
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